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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20030879-CA
vs.
Priority No. 2

PAUL HARRY PEDERSEN,
Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The issue presented in this appeal is whether the trial court's refusal to give
Pedersen's requested jury instruction regarding the lesser mental states of "reckless" and
"criminal negligence" was reversible error. Whether a trial court's refusal to give a
proposed jury instruction constitutes error is a question of law, which is reviewed for
correctness. Brewer v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R., 2001 UT 77,1J38, 31 P.3d 557.

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
All relevant statutory and constitutional provisions are set forth in the Addenda.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
Paul Harry Pedersen appeals from the judgment, sentence and commitment of the

Honorable Stephen Roth, Third District Court, after he was convicted by a jury of theft by
receiving stolen property, a third degree felony.

B.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition
On January 19, 2001, Pederson was charged by Information filed in Third District

Court with one count of Theft By Receiving Stolen Property, a Third Degree Felony, in
violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-408 (R. 3). On August 14, 2001, a Preliminary
Hearing was held, after which Defendant was bound over on the single count in the
Information (R. 16). Pederson was arraigned on September 10, 2001, where upon a not
guilty plea was entered (R. 18).
After a Jury Trial, on April 17th and 18th of 2002, Pederson was found guilty of
Theft By Receiving Stolen Property, a Third Degree Felony (R. 97).
On September 22, 2003, Pederson was sentenced to an indeterminate term of not
to exceed five (5) years in the Utah State Prison (R. 135-136).
On October 9, 2003, Pedersen filed a notice of appeal in Third District Court (R.
137).

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
A.

Testimony of Nathan Haynes
Nathan Haynes is the owner of a tree service company. As part of that business he

owned a stump grinder. Haynes had purchased this machine a year and a half to two
2

years earlier Horn Hob ano Kaih\ i airbanks (R 158: 81-82).
1

Murine the time that Haynes owned the machine he pride minor repairs and

altuaiums oi.

; le 'Aeld^u \i\^ lioi.i ;>*^ u* a\c irame and patched the gas umk »iv

N

82). There was also a unique configuration «>t il»« i.-t"i- . »n ;> wheel whirl-, nere set up
\\ itli dillciv

-

:

.;. :,,.. v.. LinuuiM.ai .J alierauon r-i. ;,IL .i.a.iaiic

was a bright blue rope which held up a guard, allowing the machine to go closer to walls
.1 ill truces Ik ISR. K,MUf

. '

. '

.

•

' ..

Haynes is shown Exhibit 4, the original agreement of purchase. Exhibit 1 -^h -w tl: le • late of pi u: chase as \ pi ill 28. , 1999 (R 158: 83) I Ia> lies states tl lat depc > i
weather in November work can be slow

I le states that he was not working a lot m

November oi 2u0<v Havnes states ih-jt ilv <*
Action Auto on V)" Souih

a

•

:

^ *

it

' l a>\ ulicre a couple of his dump trucks were stored as

well, i he ma*-dine w ^ chined to the front tire, of one of these trucks (R 158: 84).
Haynt: : J M I I I ^ J ;iu«. ^.^ ,. ^ K S were in the open parking lot which is accessible from the street; and that the stump grinder was on a trailer. Haynes states that he did not
registei (he trailer oi (he in u limn \ (l<! I iK F.-I HS)
On November 30, 2000 Haynes received a phone call from Ben Gardeno, who is in
lin I n v sen icr business (l< I »' K Nfu Hun inloniicd Mi I l,i> ncs tlul illicit,; w.na <
- i 111111 >
grinder for sale that had the guard held up with a bright blue rope, which made Ben call
and ask if I Ia> nes still had his sti imp grinder

1 lay i les left 1 lis 1 101 ise • ai id \ < < = i it to \ • :tl. :« I

A u t o to check on his stump grinder (R 158: 87). He found that the trailer, stump grinder,
and chain that tied everything ur were tio-v <
w i t h a key to the lock on the chain (R. 158: 87).

3

:

!

-u

(

^

->ne

Haynes states that he called Ben and had a meeting set up with Scott VanDam,
stating that Mr. Haynes was looking to buy a stump grinder and was interested in one that
Mr. VanDam had looked at (R. 158: 88). Ha}mes met Scott in a parking lot at the corner
of 11th East and 27th South on November 30. Mr. VanDam was going to work so he
pointed to the vicinity of where the stump grinder was located, a couple of blocks from
where they were (R. 158: 88-89). Haynes went walking on 11th East to see if he could see
it. On the corner of 11th East and Crandall Haynes saw the trailer for the stump grinder
(R. 158: 89).
Mr. Haynes says that he may have called to report the stump grinder stolen prior to
his looking for it (R. 158: 89). When he saw the trailer he tried to look into the garage
through a window that was covered by what appeared to be a blanket. Haynes states that
the trailer was not visible from the street, but was behind the garage (R. 158: 89). He
knew that it was the trailer because of how it was banged up and it had little red tie-down
straps that were broken off at the back. He knew what parts and pieces were bent and
broken (R. 158:90).
Mr. Haynes states that he went back to his truck at 27th and 11th. He got in and
drove down close to the house so he could watch and call the police (R. 158: 93).
Haynes testified that Tiffany Gunnuscio and Chris Hennefer were with him during
all of this. Because the extent of involvement by VanDam was unknown, Gunnuscio and
Hennefer were there to follow Mr. VanDam. Once Haynes found the trailer, he called the
others who returned to where Haynes was, after he had called the police Haynes states
that the three were in communication almost the entire time via cellular phones. (R. 158:
96).
Upon return Gunnuscio and Hennefer approached the house to see if they could
4

purchase the stump grinder (R. 158: 96). Haynes could not see very well, but saw them
come out of the house once or twice. They went into the garage and came out. The
Police arrived and were talking to Mr. Haynes on the sidewalk as the defendant was
walking to the garage with Hennefer and Gunnuscio. Haynes states that the Police
contacted the three and seconds later they all came to where he was and the defendant
was in handcuffs (R. 158: 97).
Haynes identified the person in handcuffs as the defendant (R. 158: 97-98). He
stated he saw the stump grinder in the garage when the police were there. Haynes was
shown two photographs and identified the first as a Vermeer 222 stump cutter. He stated
that the photograph accurately depicted what he saw on November 30, 2000 inside the
garage at 1103 East Crandall (R. 158: 98). He also affirmed that the photo depicts the
condition and location of the machine on that date. From the second photo he affirmed
that it depicted the same machine in the same location with a gas tank cover over it on the
same day (R. 158:99).
Haynes states that after he identified the machine as his, the Police took
photographs of it and told him to take it home. He stated that they handcuffed the
defendant and put him in the car (R. 158: 101). Mr. Haynes that he was not acquainted
with the defendant and did not authorize him or anyone to take the stump grinder as of
November 30, 2000 (R. 158: 101-102). Haynes affirmed that the machine did have a
value on that date.

B. Testimony of Chris Hennefer
Chris Hennefer testified that he was friends with Nathan Haynes in November of
2000 (R. 158: 108). Hennefer also worked with Haynes in the tree service industry (R.
5

158: 108).
On November 30, 2000, Hennefer was with Tiffany Gunniscio (R. 158: 108). On
that day they went to the location of the stump grinder (R. 158: 108). Gunniscio had
called Hennefer and indicated that "they had a lead where the equipment was that was
stolen"-namely the stump grinder and the trailer (R. 158: 109). Hennefer had worked
with the stump grinder prior to the time it was stolen (R. 158: 109). According to
Hennefer, Haynes told him that "Scott VanDam had [given] him the lead, that the
defendant was in touch with Scott VanDam to sell him the stump grinder" (R. 158: 111).
Hennefer also testified that the equipment had been missing 1-3 days (R. 158: 120).
Hennefer and Gunniscio went to 1103 East Crandall Avenue in Salt Lake County
to try and find the stolen equipment (R. 158: 109). The address is a blue home with a
garage in the back (R. 158: 109). They knocked on the door and Paul Pedersen answered
(R. 158: 110). Hennefer told Pedersen that VanDam had indicated that there was a stump
grinder for sale (R. 158: 111). Pedersen lei them into the home and locked the door
behind them (R. 158: 112). It appeared that Pedersen had just woken up as he seemed a
little groggy and was not wearing a shirt (R. 158: 121). While Pedersen was putting on a
shirt in the bedroom, Hennefer opened the door and stepped outside while continuing to
converse with Pedersen about the stump grinder and its possible price (R. 158: 112-13).
Hennefer testified that Pedersen led him to believe that "it was his stump grinder" (R.
158: 113). Hennefer testified that he was in the house between 2-5 minutes (R. 158: 123).
While they walked from the front door to the garage, Gunniscio began asking
questions and Pedersen "started getting nervous" (R. 158: 114). Hennefer testified that
Pedersen told Gunniscio "something different than he told me that the stump grinder
belonged to a friend" (R. 158: 114). At this point Hennefer said he was talking to 911 on
6

his cell phone in an effort to get the police involved quickly (R. 158: 114).
The group went to the garage after it was unlocked by Pedersen and the stump
grinder was inside (R. 158: 114). Hennefer testified that he recognized the grinder as the
one that belonged to Haynes (R. 158: 114-15, 117).
Shortly afterwards 2-4 deputies from the Sheriffs Department arrived (R. 158:
122).

C.

Testimony of Tiffany Gunnuscio
On November 30, 2000, Gunnuscio was at 1103 East Crandall Avenue in Salt

Lake County with Hennefer (R. 158: 128-29). They arrived at the address in Hennefer's
vehicle and were there to look for a stump grinder (R. 158: 129). Haynes was also at the
address (R. 158: 129). From across the street, Gunnuscio observed Hennefer knock on
the door of the residence and saw Hennefer enter the residence when Pedersen answered
the knock (R. 158: 129-30). Hennefer subsequently came "running" out of the residence
and Gunnuscio went up to the door (R. 158: 130). However, before she could knock on
the door, Pedersen came to the door and subsequently spoke with her inside the residence
(R. 158: 131, 138). Gunnuscio informed Pedersen that "we were with Advanced and that
we were looking to buy a stump grinder and heard that he had one for sale" (R. 158: 131).
After Pedersen questioned Hennefer about his knowledge of trees, he took them to
the garage and showed them the stump grinder (R. 158: 132, 133). A dog was tied up
inside the garage (R. 158: 132, 140). While they were discussing prices, the sheriff
"pulled up" (R. 158: 133). According to Gunnuscio, Pedersen "hurried and shut the
garage really quick" when they saw the police (R. 158: 136). Gunnuscio testified that
they offered to by the grinder immediately but that Pedersen told them to come back in an
7

hour(R. 158: 136).
Gunnuscio identified the stump grinder as belonging to Haynes because of the
"blue rope tied to it" (R. 158: 134). Gunnuscio eventually observed the trailer behind the
garage (R. 158: 136).
During the preliminary hearing, Gunnuscio admitted to testifying that Pedersen
had told her that he was selling the trailer for a friend (R. 158: 139).

D.

Testimony of Sergeant Henry Beltran
Henry Beltran is a sergeant with the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office (R. 158:

144). On November 30, 2000, at approximately 10:00 a.m., he was dispatched to 1103
East Crandall Avenue in Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County (R. 158: 144). Beltran and his
partner responded to the address and made contact with Haynes in front of the residence
(R. 158: 144-45). After Haynes explained the situation, Beltran got the attention of
Hennefer, Gunnuscio, and Pedersen who were coming out of the residence (R. 158: 145).
Beltran then spoke with Pedersen and asked to look at the stump grinder and trailer
that were for sale (R. 158: 145-46). Pedersen informed him that they were in the garage
and then Pedersen opened the garage door (R. 158: 146). Beltran observed a large stump
grinder in the garage and located the trailer "at the rear of the garage in the open" (R. 158:
146).
Beltran then advised Pedersen of his Miranda rights (R. 158: 147). After
acknowledging his constitutional rights, Pedersen spoke with Beltran (R. 158: 147).
Beltran asked where the grinder and trailer came from and was told by Pedersen "that his
friend, Wade, asked him to store these items at this residence" (R. 158: 147). Pedersen
did not or could not, however, give Wade's last name, address or phone number to
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Beltran(R. 158: 148, 154).
Beltran subsequently arrested Pedersen for felony theft and placed him in
handcuffs (R. 158: 148, 218). Beltran testified that to the best of his knowledge, the
equipment was not tested for fingerprints (R. 158: 149-50).
Beltran was later given the names of Wade Mace and Scott VanDam in connection
with this case, however, he did not conduct any follow-up investigation in regards to this
information (R. 159:214).

E.

Testimony of Dennis Couch
Dennis Couch, the chief investigator with the Salt Lake Legal Defenders Office,

testified that he contacted Great Basin Vermeer in Salt Lake City in order to try and
determine the value of the stump grinder (R. 159: 176-77).
Couch testified that he was not able to determine if the Fairbanks had sold the
equipment to Haynes (R. 159: 178). Couch was unable to determine that an individual
named Wade Mace had been previously booked and released into the Salt Lake County
Metro Jail (R. 159: 180).

F.

Testimony of Paul Pedersen
Pedersen testified that he did not own the tree stump grinder in question but that it

belonged to Wade Mace (R. 159: 186). Pedersen met Mace at a pawn shop/loan store in
Salt Lake (R. 159: 186, 196). Two days later Mace brought Pedersen his stump grinder
and asked Pedersen to store it (R. 159: 186). Mace told Pedersen that he had a tree
business but "was down on his luck" (R. 159: 186). Mace "was in over his head with
bills and things and that he was on the verge of having to sell some equipment to get up
9

from under... the hole he had dug for himself (R. 159: 186-87). Mace had some
equipment he wanted to sell but felt that he needed to get it closer to downtown Salt Lake
in order to sell it because of the concentration of tree businesses in that area (R. 159:
187). Because of this, Pedersen offered the use of his garage with the permission of his
landlord (R. 159: 187).
Pedersen was not home when Mace brought the equipment to his house (R. 159:
188). Pedersen came home and found the equipment on the grass (R. 159: 188). Mace
later came over and put the grinder in the garage (R. 159: 188, 199). The trailer was left
outside because there was not room for it in the garage (R. 159: 198). Pedersen and Mace
spent some time talking about the tree business, the value of the equipment, and Mace
told Pedersen that he could teach him "the trade" in the Spring (R. 159: 189, 197). Mace
also told Pedersen that he would compensate his landlord for the use of the garage upon
sale of the equipment or Spring-which ever came first (R. 159: 189). Mace made several
phone calls from Pedersen's residence to several pawn shops to determine a loan price on
the machine and to his girlfriend (R. 159: 190).
The night before Hennefer and Gunnuscio came to the residence, Pedersen
received a call from Mace (R. 159: 190). Pedersen also had cell phone number for Mace
(R. 159: 200). During the conversation, Pedersen told him that because the machine was
so big, his landlord was having trouble moving around in the garage (R. 159: 190). Mace
told Pedersen that he had a buyer, Scott VanDam, that was interested in the machine for
approximately $2,000.00 (R. 159: 190-91,201).
Pedersen testified that the next morning when Hennefer and Gunnuscio came to
the house, they indicated that they were there on behalf of Scott VanDam (R. 159: 191).
Pedersen testified that Mace was to come over that morning to conduct the sale but that
10

he never did show up (R. 159: 191). Pedersen tried to "stall" Hennefer and Gunnuscio;
and he tried to reach Mace by telephone (R. 159: 191). Eventually, Pedersen showed
Hennefer and Gunnuscio the stump grinder in the garage (R. 159: 191). The garage door
was shut but unlocked (R. 159: 204). They offered to buy it and Pedersen may have
"haggled" with them over the price (R. 159: 191-92, 202). Pedersen denied telling
Hennefer that he worked in the tree industry or that he wanted to get out of the tree
business (R. 159:203).
When the police arrived, Pedersen readily spoke with them and told them that the
property belonged to Wade (R. 159: 192). Pedersen testified that he was so nervous and
upset at the time that he "just couldn't come up with" Wade's last name "right then
because [he] had handcuffs on" and was being arrested "for something that [he] didn't
do" (R. 159: 192). Pedersen later obtained a statement from Scott VanDam and it had
Wade's full name in it (R. 159: 193).
Pedersen testified that he had no reason to disbelieve that Mace owned this
property (R. 159: 193). Pedersen also stated that he had no reason not to believe that
Hennefer and Gunnuscio were at the residence on behalf of VanDam as had been
arranged by Mace (R. 159: 193). Pedersen did not know that the equipment was stolen
(R. 159:207).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court committed reversible error when, over the objections of Pedersen, it
refused to give a requested jury instruction regarding the definitions of the non-culpable
mental states of "recklessly" and "criminally negligent" and the jury's responsibility to
find Pedersen not guilty if they found he acted "recklessly" or with "criminal negligence"
11

as opposed to "knowingly" and "intentionally". Pedersen asserts that said instruction
should have been given because there was ample evidence introduced at trial for a jury to
reasonably conclude that Pedersen acted not "knowingly" or "intentionally," but rather
"recklessly" or with "criminally negligence." An instruction, therefore, defining
"recklessly" and "criminal negligence" and instructing the jury to find Pedersen not guilty
if they found that he had acted with such intent rather than "knowingly" and/or
"intentionally" would have been sufficiently advised the jury as to the law.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO GIVE PEDERSEN'S REQUESTED JURY
INSTRUCTION REGARDING THE LESSER MENS REA MENTAL STATES OF
RECKLESSNESS AND CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE CONSTITUTED ERROR
WHICH WARRANTS REVERSAL OF THE CONVICTION AND REMAND FOR
A NEW TRIAL
Pedersen asserts that the trial court refusal to give his requested jury instruction
regarding the alternate mens rea mental states of "recklessly" and "criminal negligence,"
in addition to the "knowingly" and "intentionally" instruction which was given,
constituted error, and that his conviction should therefore be reversed. Specifically, at the
close of the presentation of evidence at Pedersen's trial, Pedersen's counsel requested the
trial court give a jury instruction which defined not only the terms "knowingly" and
"intentionally" but also "recklessly" and "criminal negligence" and the specific
instruction that the jury should not find Pedersen guilty if they found Pedersen acted
"recklessly" or "with criminal negligence." (R. 91-92). The requested instruction read in
pertinent part:
12

Acting "intentionally" or "knowingly" is more than acting "recklessly" or
with "criminal negligence."
A person acts "recklessly" with respect to circumstances surrounding his
conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards
a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will
occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a
gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise
under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.
With "criminal negligence," a person acts with respect to circumstances
surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he ought to be aware of
a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will
occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it
constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person
would exercise in all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.
If you find Paul Harry Pedersen acted "recklessly" or with "criminal
negligence," but not "intentionally" or "knowingly," you must find him NOT
GUILTY.
(R. 92). The trial court, however, over the objection of Pedersen's counsel, instead gave
a jury instruction which only defined the terms "knowingly" and "intentionally" and
omitted the rest of the proposed instruction. (R. 83; judge's note at 91). Pedersen
contends, in light of the evidence presented at trial which could have supported a jury
finding of a non-culpable mental state such as "recklessly" or "criminally negligence,"
this was reversible error.
" 'Whether [a] trial court's refusal to give a proposed jury instruction constitutes
error is a question of law, which [is] [ ] review[ed] for correctness.' " Brewer v. Denver &
Rio Grande W. R.R., 31 P.3d 557, 2001 UT 77, P38, 429 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (alteration in
original)(citation omitted). This Court has also stated that" ' " [fjailure to give requested
jury instructions constitutes reversible error only if their omission tends to mislead the
jury to the prejudice of the complaining party or insufficiently or erroneously advises the
jury on the law." ' " State v. Stringham, 2001 UT App 13, f 17, 17 P.3d 1153 (citation
13

omitted). By omitting the requested jury instmction regarding the less culpable mens rea
states of "recklessly" and "negligently", when the evidence adduced at trial could fairly
support a finding by the jury of an alternate mental state other than knowingly, the trial
court insufficiently advised the jury on the law.
In State v. Meyer, 2001 UT App 297, a case which involved a trial court's failure
to give a self-defense jury instruction, this Court stated that "[a] jury instruction on selfdefense must be given 'when the defendant has presented sufficient evidence that [the
defendant's] assertion of self-defense rises to a conscious level in the minds of jury' "
(quoting State v. Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, ^[8, 18 P.3d 1123. Furthermore, the Utah
Supreme Court has stated that "[w]e are not concerned with the reasonableness, nor the
credibility of the defendant's evidence relating to his [or her] claim of self-defense,"
State v. Torres, 619 P.2d 694, 695 (Utah 1980), and this Court only decides whether
"there is a basis in the evidence . . . which would provide some reasonable basis for the
jury to conclude" that defendant acted in self-defense. State v. Knoll, 712 P.2d 211, 214
(Utah 1985) (see also State v. Meyer, 2001 UT App 297).
Pedersen's case is similar to the defendant Meyer's case in many respects. First,
although Pedersen's case does not involve a self-defense jury instruction, it does involve
a dispute over a jury instruction where Pedersen, like Meyer, presented "sufficient
evidence" to rise to a "conscious level in the minds of the jury" regarding his "reckless"
or "criminally negligent" state of mind as opposed to the culpable mental states of
"knowing" or "intentional". The following facts adduced at trial support Pedersen's
contention that there was sufficient evidence presented for a jury to reasonably conclude
that he had acted with only "recklessness" or "criminal negligence":
Pedersen testified that he did not own the tree stump grinder in question but that it
14

belonged to Wade Mace (R. 159: 186). Pedersen met Mace at a pawn shop/loan store in
Salt Lake (R. 159: 186, 196). Two days later Mace brought Pedersen his stump grinder
and asked Pedersen to store it (R. 159: 186). Mace told Pedersen that he had a tree
business but "was down on his luck" (R. 159: 186). Mace "was in over his head with
bills and things and that he was on the verge of having to sell some equipment to get up
from under... the hole he had dug for himself (R. 159: 186-87). Mace had some
equipment he wanted to sell but felt that he needed to get it closer to downtown Salt Lake
in order to sell it because of the concentration of tree businesses in that area (R. 159:
187). Because of this, Pedersen offered the use of his garage with the permission of his
landlord (R. 159: 187).
Pedersen also testified that he was not home when Mace brought the equipment to
his house (R. 159: 188). Pedersen came home and found the equipment on the grass (R.
159: 188). Mace later came over and put the grinder in the garage (R. 159: 188, 199).
The trailer was left outside because there was not room for it in the garage (R. 159: 198).
Pedersen and Mace spent some time talking about the tree business, the value of the
equipment, and Mace told Pedersen that he could teach him "the trade" in the Spring (R.
159: 189, 197). Mace also told Pedersen that he would compensate his landlord for the
use of the garage upon sale of the equipment or Spring-which ever came first (R. 159:
189) The night before Hennefer and Gunnuscio came to the residence, Pedersen
received a call from Mace (R. 159: 190). During the conversation, Pedersen told him that
because the machine was so big, his landlord was having trouble moving around in the
garage (R. 159: 190). Mace told Pedersen that he had a buyer, Scott VanDam, that was
interested in the machine for approximately $2,000.00 (R. 159: 190-91, 201).
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Pedersen further testified that the next morning when Hennefer and Gunnuscio
came to the house, they indicated that they were there on behalf of Scott VanDam (R.
159: 191). Pedersen testified that Mace was 1o come over that morning to conduct the
sale but that he never did show up (R. 159: 191). Pedersen tried to "stall" Hennefer and
Gunnuscio; and he tried to reach Mace by telephone (R. 159: 191). Eventually, Pedersen
showed Hennefer and Gunnuscio the stump grinder in the garage (R. 159: 191). The
garage door was shut but unlocked (R. 159: 204). They offered to buy it and Pedersen
may have "haggled" with them over the price (R. 159: 191-92, 202). Pedersen denied
telling Hennefer that he worked in the tree industry or that he wanted to get out of the tree
business (R. 159:203).
When the police arrived, Pedersen readily spoke with them and told them that the
property belonged to Wade (R. 159: 192). Pedersen testified that he was so nervous and
upset at the time that he "just couldn't come up with" Wade's last name "right then
because [he] had handcuffs on" and was being arrested "for something that [he] didn't
do" (R. 159: 192). Pedersen later obtained a statement from Scott VanDam and it had
Wade's full name in it (R. 159: 193).
Pedersen ultimately testified that he had no reason to disbelieve that Mace owned
this property (R. 159: 193). He also stated that he had no reason not to believe that
Hennefer and Gunnuscio were at the residence on behalf of VanDam as had been
arranged by Mace (R. 159: 193). Pedersen did not know that the equipment was stolen
(R. 159:207).
The above record citations presented sufficient evidence at trial that Pedersen's
mental state at the time of possessing the property was arguably "reckless" or "criminally
negligent" and not "knowing" or "intentional" as required by statute, and therefore the
16

jury instruction requested by Pedersen, like the self-defense instruction in Meyer, should
have been given. Furthermore, "[w]e are not concerned with the reasonableness, nor the
credibility of the defendant's evidence .. .", but this Court is to decide only whether
"there is a basis in the evidence . .. which would provide some reasonable basis for the
jury to conclude" that Pedersen acted with a different mental state other than the culpable
"knowing" and "intentional" as required by the statute. As outlined in the record citations
above, there is a basis in the evidence which would provide some reasonable basis for the
jury to conclude that Pedersen acted "recklessly" or "criminally negligently" rather than
"knowingly" and "intentionally", and therefore the jury should have been instructed on
the definitions of said states and instructed to find Pedersen not guilty if they found he
acted "recklessly" or with "criminal negligence".

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
For the foregoing reasons, Pedersen respectfully asks this Court to find that the
trial court erred in not giving his requested jury instruction, and over his objection, giving
only an instruction relating to the definitions of "knowingly" and "intentionally", and that
his conviction should therefore be reversed and remanded to the district court for a new
trial.
RESPECTFULLYSUBMITTED this 12th day of April, 2004.

*atrick V. Lindsay
Counsel for Appellant
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this subsection shall not include a security interest for the
repayment of a debt or obligation.
(3) It is a defense under this p a r t that the actor:
(a) Acted under an honest claim of right to the
property or service involved; or
(b) Acted in the honest belief that he had the right
to obtain or exercise control over the property or
service as he did; or
(c) Obtained or exercised control over the property
or service honestly believing that the owner, if
present, would have consented.
1974
76-6-403. Theft — E v i d e n c e to s u p p o r t accusation.
Conduct denominated theft in this p a r t constitutes a single
offense embracing the separate offenses such as those heretofore known as larceny, larceny by trick, larceny by bailees,
embezzlement, false pretense, extortion, blackmail, receiving
stolen property. An accusation of theft may be supported by
evidence that it was committed in any manner specified in
Sections 76-6-404 through 76-6-410, subject to the power of
the court to ensure a fair trial by granting a continuance or
other appropriate relief where the conduct of the defense
would be prejudiced by lack of fair notice or by surprise. 1974
76-6-404. Theft — E l e m e n t s .
u. A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the property of another with a purpose to
deprive him thereof.
1973
176-6-404.5. Wrongful a p p r o p r i a t i o n — P e n a l t i e s .
*p£" (1) A person commits wrongful appropriation if he obtains
| or exercises unauthorized control over the property of another,
|without the consent of the owner or legal custodian and with
f Stent to temporarily appropriate, possess, or use the property
loJ to temporarily deprive the owner or legal custodian of
IpSssession of the property.
11^(2) The consent of the owner or legal custodian of the
jfproperty to its control by the actor is not presumed or implied
because of the owner's or legal custodian's consent on a
Igrevious occasion to the control of the property by any person.
\(3) Wrongful appropriation is punishable one degree lower
L theft, as provided in Section 76-6-412, so that a violation
|hich would have been:
(a) a second degree felony under Section 76-6-412 if it
jfchad been theft is a third degree felony if it is wrongful
| l u appropriation;
(b) a third degree felony under Section 76-6-412 if it
-.had been theft is a class A misdemeanor if it is wrongful
| . appropriation;
(c) a class A misdemeanor under Section 76-6-412 if it
had been theft is a class B misdemeanor if it is wrongful
^appropriation; and
^ (d) a class B misdemeanor under Section 76-6-412 if it
jr|iad been theft is a class C misdemeanor if it is wrongful
il&PPropriation.
ijgj. Wrongful appropriation is a lesser included offense of
| e offense of theft under Section 76-6-404.
2001
P - M 0 5 . Theft b y d e c e p t i o n .
§L1) A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises control
p£j? r °perty of another by deception and with a purpose to
|Pnve him thereof.
Jj Theft by deception does not occur, however, when there
P^y falsity as to matters having no pecuniary significance,
§ ? ™ £ by statements unlikely to deceive ordinary persons
5 ^ group addressed "Puffing" means an exaggerated
^gendation of wares or worth in communications ad-

l £ ? *° ^ e P u ^ uc o r t o a c ^ ass o r group.

1973

-Theft b y extortion.
S$k person is guilty of theft if he obtains or exercises
ov
er the property of another by extortion and with a
pse to deprive him thereof.

76-6-408

(2) As used in this section, extortion occurs when a person
threatens to:
(a) Cause physical h a r m in the future to the person
threatened or to any other person or to property at any
time; or
(b) Subject the person threatened or any other person
to physical confinement or restraint; or
(c) Engage in other conduct constituting a crime; or
(d) Accuse any person of a crime or expose him to
hatred, contempt, or ridicule; or
(e) Reveal any information sought to be concealed by
t h e person threatened; or
(f) Testify or provide information or withhold testimony or information with respect to another's legal claim
or defense; or
(g) Take action as an official against anyone or anything, or withhold official action, or cause such action or
withholding; or
(h) Bring about or continue a strike, boycott, or other
similar collective action to obtain property which is not
demanded or received for the benefit of the group which
the actor purports to represent; or
(i) Do any other act which would not in itself substantially benefit him but which would h a r m substantially
any other person with respect to t h a t person's health,
safety, business, calling, career, financial condition, reputation, or personal relationships.
1973
76-6-407.

Theft of lost, mislaid, or m i s t a k e n l y delive r e d property.
A person commits theft when:
(1) He obtains property of another which he knows to
have been lost or mislaid, or to have been delivered under
k a mistake as to the identity of the recipient or as to the
n a t u r e or amount of the property, without taking reasonable measures to r e t u r n it to t h e owner; and
(2) He has the purpose to deprive the owner of the
property when he obtains the property or at any time
prior to taking the measures designated in paragraph (1).

1973
76-6-408.

R e c e i v i n g s t o l e n p r o p e r t y — Duties of p a w n brokers.
(1) A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of t h e property of another knowing that it h a s been
stolen, or believing t h a t it probably has been stolen, or who
conceals, sells, withholds or aids in concealing, selling, or
withholding the property from the owner, knowing the property to be stolen, intending to deprive the owner of it.
(2) The knowledge or belief required for Subsection (1) is
presumed in the case of an actor who:
(a) is found in possession or control of other property
stolen on a separate occasion;
(b) h a s received other stolen property within t h e year
preceding the receiving offense charged;
(c) being a dealer in property of the sort received,
retained, or disposed, acquires it for a consideration
which he knows is far below its reasonable value; or
(d) if the value given for the property exceeds $20, is a
pawnbroker or person who has or operates a business
dealing in or collecting used or secondhand merchandise
or personal property, or an agent, employee, or representative of a pawnbroker or person who buys, receives, or
obtains property and fails to require the seller or person
delivering the property to:
(i) certify, in writing, t h a t he has the legal rights to
sell the property;
(ii) provide a legible print, preferably the right
thumb, at the bottom of the certificate next to his
signature; and

76-6-409
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(iii) provide at least one other positive form of
picture identification.
(3) Every pawnbroker or person who has or operates a
business dealing in or collecting used or secondhand merchandise or personal property, and every agent, employee, or
representative of a pawnbroker or person who fails to comply
with the requirements of Subsection (2)(d) shall be presumed
to have bought, received, or obtained the property knowing it
to have been stolen or unlawfully obtained. This presumption
may be rebutted by proof.
(4) When, in a prosecution under this section, it appears
from the evidence that the defendant was a pawnbroker or a
person who has or operates a business dealing in or collecting
used or secondhand merchandise or personal property, or was
an agent, employee, or representative of a pawnbroker or
person, that the defendant bought, received, concealed, or
withheld the property without obtaining the information required in Subsection (2)(d), then the burden shall be upon the
defendant to show t h a t the property bought, received, or
obtained was not stolen.
(5) Subsections (2)(d), (3), and (4) do not apply to scrap
metal processors as defined in Section 76-10-901.
(6) As used in this section:
(a) "Receives" means acquiring possession, control, or
title or lending on the security of the property;
(b) "Dealer" means a person in the business of buying
or selling goods.
1998
76-6-409. Theft of services.
(1) A person commits theft if he obtains services which he
knows are available only for compensation by deception,
threat, force, or any other means designed to avoid t h e due
payment for them.
(2) A person commits theft if, having control over the
disposition of services of another, to which he knows h e is not
entitled, he diverts the services to his own benefit or to the
benefit of another who he knows is not entitled to them.
(3) In this section "services" includes, but is not limited to,
labor, professional service, public utility and transportation
services, restaurant, hotel, motel, tourist cabin, rooming
house, and like accommodations, the supplying of equipment,
tools; vehicles, or trailers for temporary use, telephone or
telegraph service, steam, admission to entertainment, exhibitions, sporting events, or other events for which a charge is
made.
(4) Under this section "services" includes gas, electricity,
water, sewer, or cable television services, only if t h e services
are obtained by threat, force, or a form of deception not
described in Section 76-6-409.3.
(5) Under this section "services" includes telephone services
Dnly if the services are obtained by threat, force, or a form of
deception not described in Sections 76-6-409.5 through 76-6409.9.
1994
76-6-409.1. D e v i c e s for theft of services — S e i z u r e a n d
d e s t r u c t i o n — Civil actions for d a m a g e s .
(1) A person may not knowingly:
(a) make or possess any instrument, apparatus, equipment, or device for the use of, or for the purpose of,
committing or attempting to commit theft under Section
76-6-409 or 76-6-409.3; or
(b) sell, offer to sell, advertise, give, transport, or otherwise transfer to another any information, instrument,
apparatus, equipment, or device, or any information,
plan, or instruction for obtaining, making, or assembling
the same, with intent t h a t it be used, or caused to be used,
to commit or attempt to commit theft under Section
76-6-409 or 76-6-409.3.
(2) (a) Any information, instrument, apparatus, equipment, or device, or information, plan, or instruction re-
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ferred to in Subsection (1) may be seized p u r s u a n t to a
court order, lawful search and seizure, lawful arrest, or
other lawful process.
(b) Upon the conviction of any person for a violation of
any provision of this section, any information, instrument, apparatus, equipment, device, plan, or instruction
shall be destroyed as contraband by the sheriff of the
county in which the person was convicted.
(3) A person who violates any provision of Subsection (1) or
(2) is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(4) Criminal prosecutions under this section do not affect
any person's right of civil action for redress for damages
suffered as a result of any violation of this section.
1987
76-6-409.3. Theft of u t i l i t y or c a b l e t e l e v i s i o n services
— R e s t i t u t i o n — Civil a c t i o n for d a m a g e s .
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Cable television service" means any audio, video,
or data service provided by a cable television company
over its cable system facilities for payment, b u t does not
include the use of a satellite dish or antenna.
(b) "Owner" includes any part-owner, joint owner, tenant in common, joint tenant, or t e n a n t by the entirety of
the whole or a p a r t of any building and the property on
which it is located.
(c) "Person" means any individual, firm, partnership,
corporation, company, association, or other legal entity.
(d) "Tenant or occupant" includes any person, including
the owner, who occupies the whole or p a r t of any building,
whether alone or with others.
(e) "Utility" means any public utility, municipallyowned utility, or cooperative utility which provides electricity, gas, water, or sewer, or any combination of them,
for sale to consumers.
(2) A person is guilty of theft of a utility or cable television
service if the person commits any prohibited acts which make
gas, electricity, water, sewer, or cable television available to a
tenant or occupant, including himself, with intent to avoid due
payment to t h e utility or cable television company. Any person
aiding and abetting in these prohibited acts is a party to the
offense under Section 76-2-202. Prohibited acts include:
(a) connecting any tube, pipe, wire, cable, or other
instrument with any meter, device, or other instrument
used for conducting gas, electricity, water, sewer, or cable
television in a m a n n e r as permits the use of the gas,
electricity, water, sewer, or cable television without its
passing through a meter or other instrument recording
the usage for-billing;
(b) altering, injuring, or preventing the normal action
of a meter, valve, stopcock, or other instrument used for
measuring quantities of gas, electricity, water, or sewer
service, or making or maintaining any modification or
alteration to any device installed with the authorization
of a cable television company for the purpose of intercepting or receiving any program or other service carried by
the company which the person is not authorized by the
company to receive;
(c) reconnecting gas, electricity, water, sewer, or cable
television connections or otherwise restoring service when
one or more of those utilities or cable service have been
lawfully disconnected or turned off by the provider of the
utility or cable service;
(d) intentionally breaking, defacing, or causing to be
broken or defaced any seal, locking device, or other part of
a metering device for recording usage of gas, electricity,
water, or sewer service, or a security system for the
recording device, or a cable television control device;
(e) removing a metering device designed to measure
quantities of gas, electricity, water, or sewer service;
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A person engages in conduct knowingly, or with knowledge, with
respect to his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct
when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing
circumstances.

A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with

respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his
conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.
A person engages in conduct intentionally, or with intent or
willfully with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result
of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire to
engage in the conduct or cause the result.

INSTRUCTION NO
One of the elements of the crime of Theft by Receiving Stolen Property is
that the State must prove that the defendant acted with knowledge that the
property had been stolen or that he believed that it probably had been stolen and
that he intended to deprive the owner of the property thereof.
You are instructed that in every crime or public offense, there must be a
union or joint operation of the act and the actor's mental state. A person is only
guilty of an offense when his conduct is prohibited by law and he acts with some
kind of criminal intent, that is he acts intentionally or knowingly as the definition
of the offense requires.
A person engages in conduct "intentionally," or with intent or willfully with
respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his
conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.
A person engages in conduct "knowingly," or "with knowledge," with
respect to his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is
aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts
"knowingly," or "with knowledge," with respect to a result of his conduct when he
is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.

Acting "intentionally" or "knowingly" is more than acting "recklessly" or
with "criminal negligence."
A person acts "recklessly" with respect to circumstances surrounding his
conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the
result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its disregard
constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person
would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.
With "criminal negligence," a person acts with respect to circumstances
suiTOunding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he ought to be aware of
a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will
occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it
constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person
would exercise in all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.
If you find Paul Harry Pedersen acted "recklessly" or with "criminal
negligence," but not "intentionally" or "knowingly," you must find him NOT
GUILTY.
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